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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KELLY GATES, SR,
Petitioner,

CaseNo.20010934-CA

v.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
and GEORGE M. ANDERSON,
Respondent,

Priority No. 7

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
GEORGE M. ANDERSON

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

This appellate review proceeding arises from the Utah Labor Commissioner's
determination that Petitioner George Anderson's work related injuries entitle him to
medical, temporary total, and permanent partial disability benefits. The Utah Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2)
(a) (1953, as amended) and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801 (8) (1997).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issue No. 1: Whether the brief of Kelly Gates, Sr. should be considered by this
Court where the brief fails to marshal the evidence against Gates, fails to appropriately
cite to the record or case law, provides little legal analysis, does not contain the required
addendum, and misrepresents the record?
Standard of Appellate Review: "To effectively challenge the Board's findings of
fact, a party must marshal 'all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite
the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.'" Merriam v. Board of Review 812 P.2d 447,
450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 68);
accord Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841, 843-4 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).
"'[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research.'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988).
Furthermore, "[i]t is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an
argument that a party has failed to adequately brief." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
305, 313 (Utah 1998); See also State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 414 (Utah 1993); State
v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344
(Utah 1984).
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Preservation for Appeal: This issue arose on appeal to this Court and, as such,
there was no need for preservation of the issue in the administrative proceeding.
Issue No. 2: Whether there is substantial evidence to support the Labor
Commission's finding that Kelly Gates, Sr. was Anderson's employer where Anderson
testified he was hired by Gates, used Gates' tools, was subject to the control of Gates,
and all of Anderson's paychecks were drawn on Gates' business account?
Standard of Appellate Review: This Court's review of the Labor Commission's
findings of fact is governed by §63-46b-l-16(4)(g) (1997) of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA). Under UAPA, the Labor Commission's findings of fact will be
affirmed if they are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court." Merriam v. Board of Review 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board ofReviewy 116 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)). "Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person 'might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review,
776 P.2d at 68). "It is not [the court's] prerogative on review to reweigh the evidence.
Instead, [the court] defer[s] to the Commission's findings because, when reasonably
conflicting views arise, it is the Commission's province to draw inferences and resolve
these conflicts." Id. (quoting Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 83, 68 (Utah
Ct.App. 1993)).
Preservation for Appeal: This issue was arguably never preserved for appeal.
Indeed, in setting forth the four issues in his brief, Gates does not indicate, in violation of
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Rule 24, where he had preserved any of those alleged issues.
Issue No. 3: Whether Anderson is entitled to an award of attorney fees where
Gates' brief, misrepresents the facts, refers to evidence which was "doctored", fails to
follow a majority of the requirements of Rule 24, and appears to be brought for the sole
purpose of delay?
Standard of Appellate Review: "An appeal that is frivolous is one that is cnot
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law.' Utah R. App. P. 33(b); See, Hunt v. Hurst, 785
P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990).
Preservation for Appeal: This issue arose on appeal to this Court and, as such,
there was no need for preservation of the issue in the administrative proceeding.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

Utah R. App. P. 24 is the applicable rule regarding the sufficiency of briefs and is
attached in full at Addendum "A". UTAH CODE ANN. §63-46b-16 is the applicable statute
regarding appeals from administrative actions and is attached in full at Addendum "B".
Utah R. App. P. 33 is the applicable rule regarding frivolous appeals and is attached in
full at Addendum "C".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: Kelly Gates, Sr. seeks review of the Labor Commission's
final order awarding workers' compensation benefits to Respondent, George Michael
4

Anderson, for injuries he sustained while working for the employer, Kelly Gates, Sr. dba
Kelly Gates Enterprises.
Course of the Proceedings: On August 27, 1997, Anderson filed an Application
for Hearing with the Labor Commission of Utah alleging entitlement to benefits for
medical expenses, temporary total compensation, and permanent partial disability
compensation as a result of injuries sustained on January 17, 1996, while working as a
framer for Kelly Gates, Sr. building a home in Diamond Valley, Utah. (Rl at 5).
The Labor Commission held a hearing in St. George, Utah, on July 1, 1999. (R3 at
1). The Administrative Law Judge issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on January 19, 2001, finding that Kelly Gates, Sr. was not the employer of
Anderson and dismissed Anderson's claim for workers' compensation benefits. (R2 at
356-61). A copy of said order is attached hereto as Addendum "D".
Anderson filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission on February 19,
2001. (R. 2 at 364-71). The Motion for Review was granted by the Labor Commission
on June 28, 2001, remanding the case to the Administrative Law Judge for a
determination as to the amounts owed Anderson for temporary total disability benefits,
medical expenses and permanent partial disability. (R2 at 410-14). A copy of the
Commission's order is attached hereto as Addendum "E". On July 30, 2001, the ALJ
entered an Order on Remand awarding temporary total disability, permanent partial
disability, and medical benefits to Anderson. (R2 at 420-2). A copy of the ALJ's order is
attached hereto as Addendum "F".
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On August 29, 2001, Gates filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission.
(R2 at 423-47). On November 15, 2001, the Labor Commission issued an Order Denying
Gates' Motion for Review. (R2 at 459-61). A copy of the Commission's order is attached
hereto as Addendum "G". On November 28, 2001, Gates filed a Petition for Review with
the Utah Court of Appeals. (R2 at 462-3).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

In its Order Grating Motion for Review, the Labor Commission found as

follows:
a.

On January 17, 1996, Mr. Anderson was working as a carpenter,
framing a residence to be occupied by Kelly Gates, Jr. ("Junior"
hereafter). As Anderson cut a metal band holding a stack of lumber,
the metal band snapped and cut his wrist. Surgery was required to
repair the injury. Anderson was unable to work for a period of time
after the accident; he also have suffered permanent impairment. (R2
at 410; See also, Addendum "E" at 1).

b.

Anderson contends he was employed by Junior's father, Kelly Gates,
Sr. ("Senior" hereafter) at the time of his accident, and that Senior is
liable for his workers' compensation benefits. In response, Senior
argues that Anderson was employed by Junior at the time of
Anderson's accident. Senior further argues that, because Anderson
was employed by Junior in the construction of Junior's own
residence, Anderson is excluded from coverage under the workers'
compensation system by §34A-2-103(6)(b) of the act. (R2 at 410;
See also Addendum "E" at 1).

c.

It is undisputed that Anderson's injuries resulted from a work-related
accident on January 17, 1996. It is also undisputed that Anderson
was an employee, rather than an independent contractor, at the time
of the accident. To determine whether Anderson was employed by
Junior or Senior, it is necessary to review the circumstances and
context of Anderson's work and his relationships with Senior and
Junior. (R2 at 411; See also Addendum "E" at 2).
6

d.

Senior is a businessman in the St. George area. In the past, he owned
and operated an auto dealership in St. George, by the time of the
hearing in this matter, he had formed another automobile business,
this time with Junior, his son. Under the business name of "Kelly
Gates Enterprises," Senior owns rental units, condominiums, and
town homes. He was also a principal in the development of a
residential subdivision known as Diamond Ranches, located about
15 miles from St. George. Senior gave Junior a residential building
lot in the Diamond Ranch subdivision. It was at this lot, in the
course of the construction of Junior's residence, that Anderson was
injured. (R2 at 411; See also Addendum "E" at 2).

e.

At the time of Anderson's accident, Junior was 22 years old. He had
little or no experience with building or construction. He was
employed on a full-time basis as an assistant manager at a grocery
store and also worked 30 hours a week as a salesman at a local car
dealership, both in St. George. (R2 at 411; See also Addendum "E"
at 2).

f.

In November, 1995, Senior hired Anderson to work on a cabin
Senior was building for his personal use in the Kolob Canyon area
north of St. George. Shortly thereafter, Senior also hired Anderson
and several other workers to remodel two storage units located in St.
George into business offices. At the time as the storage units were
being remodeled, Anderson and the other workers began
construction of Junior's residence in Diamond Ranch, where
Anderson suffered his injury on January 17, 1996. (R2 at 411; See
also Addendum "E" at page 2).

g.

The parties do not substantially dispute the foregoing facts.
However, the parties tell very different versions of the remaining
facts. Before the Commission sets out its findings on these disputed
issues, some general comments are in order regarding the relative
credibility of the parties. (R2 at 411; See also Addendum "E" at 2).

h.

The ALJ discounted Anderson's testimony, in part, because of his
economic self-interest in obtaining workers' compensation benefits.
But Senior, who has no workers' compensation insurance, has an
equivalent economic interest in avoiding payment of such benefits.
Consequently, economic interest does not provide a means of
judging the relative credibility of Anderson and Senior. (R2 at 411;
See also Addendum "E" at 2).
7

The ALJ also discounted Anderson's testimony on the grounds it
was contradicted by the testimony of all other witnesses. However,
after careful review of Anderson's testimony, the Commission finds
such testimony to be responsive, simple, and straight-forward.
Furthermore, Anderson's testimony does not conflict with the
testimony of Mr. Hoskins, the only disinterested individual to testify
in this matter. (R2 at 412; See also Addendum "E" at 3).
The Commission has also carefully review the testimony of Senior
and Junior and finds it to be equivocal and inconsistent.
Furthermore, Senior and Junior admit to conduct that undermines
their general credibility. For example, Senior asked Mr. Hoskins, a
construction contractor, to turn in Anderson's injury as a claim
against Hoskins' workers' compensation insurance policy. Such a
claim would have been fraudulent. To his credit, Mr. Hoskins
refused Senior's request. As another example, even in their project
to remodel storage units, where Senior admits to being Anderson's
employer, Senior failed to comply with state and federal laws
requiring withholding of income tax, payment of FICA tax,
unemployment insurance contributions, and obtaining workers'
compensation coverage. Finally, Junior admits that he submitted
false information to his construction lender in order to obtain funds
to pay Anderson's medical expenses. The foregoing conduct
diminishes the persuasive force of Senior and Junior's testimony.
(R2 at 412; See also Addendum "E" at 3).
. . . Anderson contends that he was hired by Senior to work on
remodeling the storage units in St. George and that the employment
relationship continued on to include work done at Junior's residential
building site. According to Anderson, all his significant dealings
were with Senior. He did not see Junior at the building site until the
project was well underway. In response, Junior claims to have
personally hired Anderson before the residential project and to have
negotiated the wage to be paid Anderson. However, Junior was
unable to accurately state Anderson's wage rate. In contrast, Senior
was fully aware of Anderson's wage rate. Furthermore, nearly all
the crew that Senior employed to remodel his storage units also
worked on Junior's residential project. This supports Anderson's
testimony that Senior directed his employees, Anderson included, to
work on Junior's residence. (R2 at 412; See also Addendum "E" at
3).
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As is customary in construction projects, Anderson provided his own
hand tools such as a hammer and saw for both the remodel project
and the residence project. However, Senior provided large
equipment such as an air compressor and air-driven nail guns. Junior
provided no equipment or tools. (R2 at 412; See also Addendum
"E" at 3).
There is no question that every payment of wages to Anderson was
actually made by Senior from his "Kelly Gates Enterprises"
checking account. At first, Senior testified that his payments to
Anderson were solely an accommodation to Anderson's frequent
need for cash and that such payments did not include any payments
for Anderson's work on Senior's remodeling project. However,
when confronted by financial records to the contrary, Senior
conceded that his payments to Anderson represented co-mingled
wages for work on the remodeling project and the residential project.
Junior never paid any wages directly to Anderson, although he did
make payments to Senior. It is clear that Anderson always looked
directly to Senior, not Junior, for payment of wages. (R2 at 412-3;
See also Addendum "E" at 3-4).
Senior was at the work site on a daily basis. Junior was rarely
present. Because Anderson was an experienced carpenter, he did not
require much direction in the actual performance of his work.
However, Senior felt free to exercise control over Anderson. For
example, Senior testified he ordered Anderson off the job because
Anderson was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Later in his
testimony, Senior attempts to downplay his control by stating that he
merely "suggested" that Anderson not work. But the Commission
concludes that Senior's initial testimony is the most accurate
statement of Senior's own perception of his authority over Anderson
at the work site. The Commission also notes that Senior told the
workers when to show up for work. Anderson would clear his
absences from work with Senior. (R2 at 413; See also Addendum
"E" at 4).
After his accident, when it became clear that Anderson required
medical care, Anderson sought payment from Senior. Senior told
Anderson he didn't have any money and directed Anderson to make
his request to Junior. Then, despite Senior's previous statement that
he didn't have any money, Senior transferred $1,000 to Junior, who
deposited the funds in his own account for use in paying some of
Anderson's medical expenses. It appears to the Commission that the
9

foregoing transfer of funds from Senior to Junior was intended to
create some evidence that Junior was Anderson's employer. (R2 at
413; See also Addendum "E" at 4).
In addition to the findings of fact of the Labor Commission, the following
documents were received into evidence:
a.

A "Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury or Occupational
Disease" dated January 18, 1996, one day after Anderson's accident,
wherein the emergency room physician indicates that Anderson was
injured at work and his employer was Gates Enterprises. (Rl at 1).

b.

The Washington County Building Permit Application for the
Diamond Valley home which was signed by Kelly Gates, Sr., as the
builder, dated August 29, 1995. (Rl at 211) (Gates indicates that it
is his signature on the building permit. See R3 at 61).

c.

A series of eight checks made out from Gates, Sr.'s business
account, Kelly L. Gates Enterprises, to Anderson during the time
periods in question. (Rl at 188-92).

d.

Answers to Request for Production of Documents consisting of loan
documents. (Rl at 196-7). This documentation was admittedly
"doctored" according to testimony of Kelly Gates, Jr. (R3 at 175).

In addition to the unfavorable documentation and findings issued against
Gates, the following relevant testimony was elicited at hearing:
a.

Gates' attorney asked Gates whether the money he paid Anderson
for work on the Diamond Valley home included any hours he
worked on Gates, Sr.'s office building. Gates, Sr. answered, "No.
No. Absolutely not." (R3 at 138-9). Gates, Sr. further indicated
that it would have been highly improper to include anything but
work that was done on the house. (R3 at 139). However, on cross
examination, when confronted with the "doctored" records from
State Bank of Southern Utah (Rl at 196-7), Gates, Sr. admitted that
the checks which were paid to Anderson must have been a "partial
payment on the - - on the rentals out here or - - something he done on
Kolob." (R3 at 146).
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Upon prompting from his counsel, Gates, Sr. indicated that Anderson
preferred to be paid in cash. (R3 at 79). Over objection of
Anderson's counsel, Gates, Sr. testified that the reason Anderson
wanted to be paid in cash was for "tax purposes". (R3 at 80).
However, on cross-examination, Gates, Sr. admitted that Anderson
was paid entirely by check, not cash, for the work he did on the
Diamond Valley project. (R3 at 90-1).
Gates, Sr., in an attempt to show Gates, Jr. was Anderson's boss,
testified that he was present during a conversation wherein Gates, Jr.
hired Anderson. This apparently took place over the phone. Gates,
Sr. testified, "I do not recall, but I'm going to say it was over the
telephone." (R3 at 42), leaving one to speculate how it is that Gates,
Sr., Gates, Jr., and Mr. Anderson could converse simultaneously
over the phone.
In order to explain why Anderson was paid on Gates, Sr.'s business
account, Gates, Sr., testified that Anderson was requesting money at
least every other day and it was not possible to get a draw from the
construction loan more than once every two weeks. (R3 at 46).
However, all the other framers working on the Diamond Valley
home, Bret Rasmussen, Brad Cook, Mike Schurtz, and Travis
Whitsnitzer were all paid out of Kelly L. Gates Enterprises account
as well. (R3 at 52).
When initially questioned regarding who signed for the building
permit on the Diamond Valley home, Gates, Sr. indicated that he
could not recall who had applied for the building permit, but that he
assumed his son had done so. (R3 at 61). However, when actually
presented with a copy of the building permit, Gates, Sr. indicated
that it was his signature on the building permit. (R3 at 61). Having
previously testified that he could not recall who had applied for the
building permit, Gates, Sr. had miraculous recall and was able to
testify that the reason his son did not apply for the building permit
was because "he couldn't get off work to go in and get it." (R3 at
85).
Gates, Sr. testified that after Anderson's injury, Gates, Sr. loaned his
son, Gates, Jr. $1,000 to loan Anderson to help Anderson out. That
check was written on Gates, Sr.'s account then, Gates, Jr. wrote a
check to Anderson from Gates, Jr.'s own account. (R3 at 63).
Gates, Sr. initially testified that it was his son who had delivered the
11

check to Anderson, indicating that, "I'm assuming he gave it to
Mike, the money." (R3 at 71). However, on further examination,
Gates, Sr. admitted that it was actually Gates, Sr who delivered the
$1,000 check to Anderson because the doctors "wouldn't work on
him until we could get him - - he could present some money to
them." (R3 at 72).
g.

After the hearing of July 1, 1999, it took the Administrative Law
Judge more than 18 months to issue an order on January 19, 2001.
(R3 at 356-63; See also Addendum "D"), in spite of Anderson's
request on six separate occasions requesting an order, (R3 at 350-5),
leaving one to wonder if the ALJ actually remembered the evidence
in this case.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In his brief, Gates fails to marshal any of the Labor Commission's findings against
him, any of the documentary evidence received at the hearing against him, or any of the
testimony against him. Further, Gates' brief fails to comply with Rule 24 as it provides
no legal analysis relative to the issues set forth in the brief, contains no addendum
containing the orders which have been issued by the Labor Commission, cites
inappropriately to the record and the law, does not indicate where the issues were
preserved in the Administrative agency and misrepresents the evidence. Hence, the
appeal should be summarily dismissed.
Secondly, the evidence when marshaled is substantial and supports the findings of
the Labor Commission in awarding workers' compensation benefits to Anderson in this
case.
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Finally, Gates' brief is frivolous, misstates the facts and misstates the law. As
such, an award of attorneys fees and costs should issue.

ARGUMENT

I
GATES' BRIEF SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT

On appeal, "'[a] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may
dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah
1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 111. App. 3d 1087, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111.
App. Ct. 1981)) (other citations omitted). Here, Gates' brief is inadequate for numerous
reasons.

A. GATES HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL ANY OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM

In setting forth his issues, it is apparent Gates is not satisfied with the findings of
fact of the Labor Commission. However, he does not indicate which of those findings he
disputes, let alone marshal any of the evidence which supports the Commission's
findings. Proper marshaling of the evidence entails marshaling, or listing all of the
evidence supporting any challenged finding. See, e.g. State Ex ReL T. 7., 945 P.2d 158,
164 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); En Re Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971, 977 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).

It is inappropriate for an appellant to marshal the evidence of carefully selected
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facts and excerpts of testimony in support of his own position, conveniently leaving out
facts which are negative to his case. See, e.g., Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312
(Utah 1998); Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1209, 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Additionally, it is not proper to incorrectly state marshaled "facts" in an attempt to
improve ones position on appeal. See, e.g. State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 608 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994); Johnson v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm 'n, 842 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah
Ct.App. 1992).
Once the evidence has been marshaled with appropriate citations to the record
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(e), the appellant must then show that the marshaled
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings of the trier of fact when viewing
the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the decision. See, Child v.
Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998). If an appellant fails to properly marshal the
evidence, the appellate court must presume the findings to be correct. See, Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1988).
In his brief, Gates sets forth four issues claiming that he has been substantially
prejudiced by the findings of the Labor Commission. (See Brief of Gates at pages 1-2).
Gates then goes on and sets forth a statement of relative [sic] facts wherein he makes
absolutely no reference to the 16 paragraphs of findings made by the Labor
Commissioner. (R2 at 410-3; See also Addendum "E" at pages 1-4). These findings of
the Commission are significant. For example, the Commission found:
1.

Anderson's testimony was "responsive, simple, and straight-forward." (R2
at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3).
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2.

The testimony of Gates, Sr. and Gates, Jr. is "equivocal and inconsistent."
(R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3).

3.

Gates, Sr. sought to commit fraud. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at
3).

4.

Gates, Jr. submitted false information to his construction lender. (R2 at
412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3).

5.

Gates, Jr., the purported employer or Anderson, did not know Anderson's
wage rate. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3).

6.

Gates, Sr. did know Anderson's wage rate. (R2 at 412; See also,
Addendum "E" at 3).

7.

Gates, Sr.'s crew that worked at the Diamond Valley project also worked to
remodel his storage units. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3).

8.

Gates, Sr. provided large equipment to do the Diamond Valley work such as
a compressor and air-driver nail guns. Gates, Jr. provided no equipment or
tools. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3).

9.

All of Anderson's wages were paid out of Gates, Sr.'s Kelly Gates
Enterprises checking account. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3).

10.

Gates, Sr. co-mingled payments to Anderson for work on the Diamond
Valley and remodeling projects. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3).

11.

Gates, Jr. never made any direct payment to Anderson, but he did make
payment to Gates, Sr. (R2 at 412-13; See also, Addendum "E" at 3-4).

12.

Anderson always looked to Gates, Sr., not junior, for wage payment. (R2 at
413; See also, Addendum "E" at 4).

13.

Gates, Sr. was on the job site on a daily basis. Gates, Jr. was there rarely.
(R2 at 413; See also, Addendum "E" at 4).

14.

Gates, Sr. exercised control over Anderson. (R2 at 413; See also,
Addendum "E" at 4).

15.

After Anderson was hurt, Gates, Sr. transferred $1,000 to his son, his son
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then paid the $1,000 to Anderson from the son's personal account. This
was intended to create some evidence that Gates, Jr. was Anderson's
employer. (R2 at 413; See also, Addendum "E" at 4).
In addition to failing to cite to the Commission's findings, Gates, Sr. fails to cite to
any of the unfavorable documentary evidence against him, such as the checks which were
written to Anderson on Gates, Sr.'s Kelly Gates Enterprises' account. He likewise fails to
refer to the physician's first report of injury wherein Anderson tells his treating physician
that he worked for Gates Enterprises. Further, Gates entirely fails to refer to all of the
testimony which preponderates against him, such as:
a.

Gates' attorney asked Gates whether the money he paid Anderson
for work on the Diamond Valley home included any hours he
worked on Gates, Sr.'s office building. Gates, Sr. answered, "No.
No. Absolutely not." (R3 at 138-9). Gates, Sr. further indicated
that it would have been highly improper to include anything but
work that was done on the house. (R3 at 139). However, on cross
examination, when confronted with the "doctored" records from
State Bank of Southern Utah (Rl at 196-7), Gates, Sr. admitted that
the checks which were paid to Anderson must have been a "partial
payment on the - - on the rentals out here or - - something he done on
Kolob." (R3 at 146).

b.

Upon prompting from his counsel, Gates, Sr. indicated that Anderson
preferred to be paid in cash. (R3 at 79). Over objection of
Anderson's counsel, Gates, Sr. testified that the reason Anderson
wanted to be paid in cash was for "tax purposes". (R3 at 80).
However, on cross-examination, Gates, Sr. admitted that Anderson
was paid entirely by check, not cash, for the work he did on the
Diamond Valley project. (R3 at 90-1).

c.

Gates, Sr., in an attempt to show Gates, Jr. was Anderson's boss,
testified that he was present during a conversation wherein Gates, Jr.
hired Anderson. This apparently took place over the phone. Gates,
Sr. testified, "I do not recall, but I'm going to say it was over the
telephone." (R3 at 42), leaving one to speculate how it is that Gates,
Sr., Gates, Jr., and Mr. Anderson could converse simultaneously
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over the phone.
d.

In order to explain why Anderson was paid on Gates, Sr.'s business
account, Gates, Sr., testified that Anderson was requesting money at
least every other day and it was not possible to get a draw from the
construction loan more than once every two weeks. (R3 at 46).
However, all the other framers working on the Diamond Valley
home, Bret Rasmussen, Brad Cook, Mike Schurtz, and Travis
Whitsnitzer were all paid out of Kelly L. Gates Enterprises account,
as well. (R3 at 52).

e.

When initially questioned regarding who signed for the building
permit on the Diamond Valley home, Gates, Sr. indicated that he
could not recall who had applied for the building permit, but that he
assumed his son had done so. (R3 at 61). However, when actually
presented with a copy of the building permit, Gates, Sr. indicated
that it was his signature on the building permit. (R3 at 61). Having
previously testified that he could not recall who had applied for the
building permit, Gates, Sr. had miraculous recall and was able to
testify that the reason his son did not apply for the building permit
was because "he couldn't get off work to go in and get it." (R3 at
85).

f.

Gates, Sr. testified that after Anderson's injury, Gates, Sr. loaned his
son, Gates, Jr. $1,000 to loan Anderson to help Anderson out. That
check was written on Gates, Sr.'s account then, Gates, Jr. wrote a
check to Anderson from Gates, Jr.'s own account. (R3 at 63).
Gates, Sr. initially testified that it was his son who had delivered the
check to Anderson, indicating that, "I'm assuming he gave it to
Mike, the money." (R3 at 71). However, on further examination,
Gates, Sr. admitted that it was actually Gates, Sr. who delivered the
$1,000 check to Anderson because the doctors "wouldn't work on
him until we could get him - - he could present some money to
them." (R3 at 72).

These facts which were not marshaled, nor even attempted to be marshaled by
Gates, show that the determination of the labor Commissioner that Gates, Sr. was
Anderson's employer, was supported by the record. The failure to marshal these facts,
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pursuant to the above referenced authority, is fatal and Gates, Sr.'s appeal should be
summarily dismissed.

B. GATES, SR.'S BRIEF FAILS TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24

Briefs which are not in compliance with Rule 24 can be stricken or simply
disregarded by the appellate court. U. R. App. P. 24(i); SLW/UTAH, McKAYv. Hardy,
973 P.2d 941, 948 (Utah 1998). Gates, Sr.'s brief, in addition to failing to marshal
evidence fails for a number of reasons.
Rule 24(a)(5)(A) requires that a brief "cite to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court"; or (B) "a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue
not preserved in the trial court." In this situation, Gates has done neither. He sets forth
four issues but makes no attempt to indicate where those issues were preserved in the
administrative agency, or whether they were required to be preserved. (See brief of Gates
at 1-2). It is inappropriate for a party to simply "dump the burden of argument and
research" on the other party. See, State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E. 2d 783, 784 (111. App. Ct. 1981)).
Additionally, the brief fails to contain an argument setting forth the contentions
and reasons of Gates with respect to the issues presented as required pursuant to Rule
24(a)(9). In his brief, Gates identifies, or attempts to identify four separate issues. (See
brief of Gates at pages 1-2). After setting forth those issues, they are never addressed
anywhere in the entire body of the brief. Then, Gates appears to reargue the same case
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that he argued in front of the Labor Commissioner providing little, if any, legal analysis.
It is not proper to try to reargue the same case which was argued before the trial court.
See, e.g. Butler, Crockett and Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909
P.2d 225, 236 (Utah 1995); Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Further, the authority cited by Gates is irrelevant. In a case appealed from an
administrative agency, Gates cites two criminal cases that allegedly support his position;
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) and State v. Visser, 31 P.3d 584 (Utah Ct. App.
2001). Not only are Pena and Visser irrelevant to an administrative proceeding, the
citation to those cases is inappropriate. At page nine of his brief, Gates portends to quote
from Pena, but the only citations for the case are indicated as, "(citing case)" and
"(citation of the case)". In similar fashion, in quoting the Visser case at page ten of the
brief, Gates indicates, "(citation of case)"... "(citation)". One would think that if these
two cases were so important Gates could at least find the cites located within the body of
the cases and inform the Court and counsel as to where it is he is purportedly quoting.
It is well settled that "[t]he brief of appellant should contain the points relied upon.
. . and these points should be supported by authorities. . . If the questions involved in a
case are of sufficient importance to justify asking the Court to decide them, they are
worthy of careful consideration of counsel presenting them. . . It is the duty of attorneys
practicing in this Court to present to the Court the authorities supporting their views and
to assist the Court in reaching a correct conclusion." State v. Thomas, 974 P.2d 269, 272
(Utah 1999) (quoting En Re Estate ofKunz, 7 111. App. 3d 760, 288 N.E. 2d 520, 523 (111.
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App. Ct. 1972).
Gates, Sr.'s failure to appropriately cite to legal authority is surpassed only by his
inability to cite to the record. In his statement of facts, Gates does attempt to cite to the
record, with the exception of paragraph 18 which is obviously a legal conclusion.1
A sampling of the failure to cite to the record is indicated in the following selections
from Gates5 brief:
a.

"Gates, Sr. also built condos in Santa Clara using a contractor. Those facts
are rather important evidence in determining whether Gates, Sr. would act
as a contractor on the construction of his son's own home." (See brief of
Gates at page 23).

b.

"The fact is, Gates provided only a compressor driven nail gun and the
compressor, to operate it, after the construction was well underway, in order
to accelerate the work Anderson was doing for the express purpose of
saving his son money. That was the only 'large equipment' he provided."
(See brief of Gates at page 23).

c.

"Perhaps, the last issue of significance is the Commissioner's finding that it
was Gates, Sr. who 'hired' Anderson to do the work on Gates, IPs house in
Diamond Valley. He based that determination almost entirely on the
testimony of Anderson who virtually denied ever meeting Gates II until
several weeks after he started the project." (See brief of Gates at page 267).

d.

"Gates Sr. himself was not experienced as a contractor or builder. He had
worked in the automobile business all of his professional life. He loaned
money to his son to pay the demands of Anderson and other workers until
Gates II could get a bi-weekly draw on his construction loan to keep
workers on the job, and he helped out however he could, but he was not a
contractor and received no compensation or payment for assisting his son,
except for the satisfaction of helping a son. He did not serve as a contractor
in building his son's home." (See brief of Gates at page 28).

Paragraph 18 of the Statement of Relative [sic] Facts found at page seven reads, "Gates II
was not required to have insurance, since he was building his own home, not subject to the
workman's compensation laws. See §34A-2-103(7)(b) Utah Code Annotated.
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e.

"Gates, Sr. spent time watching the workers, but acted only on the
instructions of his son in directing those workers." (See brief of Gates at
page 29).

These references contain no cite to the record. Likewise, they don't refer back to
anything that is cited in the Statement of Relative [sic] Facts. It is almost impossible to
defend against allegations contained in a brief when there is no admissible evidence cited.

C. GATES. SR. HAS MISREPRESENTED THE EVIDENCE TO THE COURT

In his attempt to undermine the findings of the Labor Commissioner, Gates
alleges, "[i]t is almost impossible in a relatively short brief to state all of the matters, in
which the respondent [sic] believes the Labor Commissioner made errors in his order
Granting [sic] the original motion for review in reading and interpreting the evidence, but
a few will demonstrate, the appellant believes, that the Labor Commissioner erred in
revising the order and the findings of fact of the ALJ, and that he acted arbitrarily and
capriciously." (See brief of Gates at page 11).
Indeed, if there are multiple factual errors on the part of the Labor Commissioner,
one would presume that Gates, Sr. would identify the most egregious error of the Labor
Commissioner and point it out to this Court. However, he is not able to do so and instead
fabricates an "error". Gates argues as follows:
"The Labor Commissioner in paragraph three of his Order states that Gates, Sr. in
the past owned an auto dealership and that he had formed another with his son,
Gates II under the business name of 'Kelly Gates Enterprises.' This is the first of
numerous misstatements of the record by the Labor Commissioner. The facts are,
that Kelly Gates, Sr. and his son, Kelly Gates II opened an automobile dealership,
not under the name of 'Kelly Gates Enterprises' which was Gates, Sr.'s own
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business, but under the name of 'Sun Land Sales and Leasing5." (See brief of
Gates at page 11).
Gates' attempt to discredit the Labor Commissioner entirely misstates the
evidence. The Labor Commissioner, in his order, did not find that Gates, Sr. and Gates,
Jr. owned an auto dealership under the name "Kelly Gates Enterprises." The Labor
Commissioner determined as follows:
"Senior is a businessman in the St. George area. In the past, he owned and
operated an auto dealership in St. George, by the time of the hearing in this
matter, he had formed another automobile business, this time with Junior,
his son. Under the business name of 'Kelly Gates Enterprises,' Senior owns
rental units, condominiums, and town homes."
(R2 at 411; See also, Addendum "E" at 2).
Indeed, the testimony from Gates, Sr. supports the finding of the Labor
Commissioner. Gates, Sr. testified:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
(R3 at 20).

Okay. And are you employed presently?
Yes and no. I'm semi-retired.
Okay.
I'm in the automobile business.
And is that in the automobile business with your son, Kelly Gates, Jr.?
Yes.

Gates further testified:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Can you tell me what Kelly L. Gates Enterprises is?
That is - - basically, it's the rental units that I have, condominiums, town
homes, various business that I have.
The same business - - part of that same business is the offices out on
Sunset?
There's no offices there, they're not finished, but the storage units are there,
and yes that's part of my - Kelly Gates Enterprises?
Kelly Gates Enterprises.
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(R3 at 46).
A plain reading of the findings of the Labor Commissioner is that Kelly Gates, Sr.
and Junior own an automobile dealership together. The record clearly indicates that is
true. Additionally, the Labor Commissioner determined that Kelly Gates, Sr. was the sole
owner of Kelly Gates Enterprises. That is supported by the record. Gates'
characterization of the Labor Commissioner's findings regarding Kelly Gates Enterprises
is absurd. The determination of the Labor Commissioner is clear. It is apparent that
Gates and his attorney are willing to misrepresent the facts to this Court in an attempt to
argue their position. That is inappropriate.
As Gates has entirely failed to marshal the evidence, provide any type of
meaningful legal analysis, has failed to follow Rule 24 and has misrepresented matters to
this Court, his appeal should be summarily dismissed.

IL
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE
LABOR COMMISSION

While Gates' brief portends to set forth four "issues", the sum of his argument
appears to be that there is insufficient evidence to support the findings of the Labor
Commission. However, Gates makes no attempt to identify the findings of the
Commission to which he takes issue. This in and of itself is a fatal flaw to his appeal.
Indeed, failure to appropriately challenge the findings of the Labor Commission must
necessarily result in those findings being conclusive for the purposes of appeal. Osman
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Home Improvement v. Indus. Comm 'n, 958 P.2d 240, 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
However, assuming that Gates' convoluted argument and issues are sufficient to
raise an issue as to the sufficiency of the findings of the Labor Commissioner, the
evidence, when marshaled, is overwhelming that Kelly Gates, Sr. was the employer of
Anderson.
As indicated by the Labor Commission, "it is well established that when an
employer has retained the right to control the worker of a workers' compensation
claimant, the claimant is the employer's employee for workers' compensation purposes."
(citing Bennett v. Indus. Comm fn, 726 P.2d 427, 429-30 (Utah 1986). (R2 at 413; See
also, Addendum "E" at 4).
It is unrefuted that Gates, Sr. was an uninsured employer without workers'
compensation insurance. The Labor Commission, quite succinctly, indicates that Gates
made the frank admission that he had hired people to remodel storage units, including
Anderson, which was not in compliance with state and federal laws requiring withholding
of income tax, FICA tax, unemployment insurance contribution, as well as workers'
compensation insurance. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3).
Yet Gates, who is clearly violating several different laws, wishes to have the Labor
Commission, as well as this Court, believe the "story" that it was not really he, but his
son, who hired Anderson to work on the Diamond Valley home. The problem with this
argument is that every piece of documentary evidence points to Kelly Gates, Sr. and his
dba, Kelly Gates Enterprises, as being the employer of Anderson. Every paycheck that
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was issued to Anderson was issued on Kelly Gates Enterprises' account. It was not
drawn on Kelly Gates, Sr.'s personal account, but his business account which included
additional projects on which he had Anderson working.
Further, when Anderson was taken in for medical treatment, he told the treating
physician that his employer was Kelly Gates Enterprises. That fact is identified in the
Physician's first report of injury and at that time, Anderson could not have possibly
known that a defense would arise that Kelly Gates, Jr. was his employer. It was a
statement that showed his then existing state of mind, before any legal proceedings began.
As Anderson stated at the time of hearing, he believed his employer to be the man who
paid him his wage, Kelly Gates, Sr. (R3 at 123).
Additionally, Gates, Sr.'s testimony was not believable. Gates, Sr. initially
testified that Anderson wanted to be paid cash for "tax purposes". However, when
confronted with his own checks drawn on the Kelly Gates Enterprises account, Gates, Sr.
had to admit that Anderson was always paid by check, not by cash, for work on the
Diamond Valley home.
Likewise, in an attempt to show that his son was Anderson's employer, Gates, Sr.
testified that his son delivered a $1,000 check to Anderson so Anderson could see the
doctor. However, upon additional examination, Gates admitted that it was he, Gates, Sr.,
who delivered the check to Anderson.
Further evidence of the scheme is evidenced by the $1,000 check which was
written out as a "loan" to Anderson. Gates, Sr., while testifying outside of the presence of
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his son, and having been examined vigorously with documentation including his own
checks, was a little wary when testifying as to where the $1,000 came from and make the
frank admission that the $1,000 offered to Anderson came from Gates, Sr. Contrary to
the testimony of his father, Gates, Jr. testified that this was money that Gates, Jr. had
obtained from his construction account. It was relatively obvious that Gates, Jr. and
Gates, Sr. were not quite able to get their stories straight as to who paid the $1,000 to
Anderson.
The documents received into evidence as well as the testimony of the witnesses,
which was incorporated into the Commission's findings, is relatively clear. Kelly Gates,
Sr. was Anderson's employer and the defense asserted in this case is lainted with lies and
misstatements. The evidence in this case is substantial and justifies the findings of the
Labor Commissioner that Gates, Sr. was Anderson's employer.

III.
GATES9 APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW AND AN AWARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS SHOULD ISSUE

In relevant part, Utah R. App. P. 33(a) provides that attorney fees and single or
double costs can be awarded to a party when they have to defend an appeal which is
frivolous or brought for the sole purpose of delay. A frivolous appeal has been defined
as, u[o]ne in which no justiciable question has been presented and appeal is readily
recognizable as devoid of merit and that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed."
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Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 601 (5th
ed. 1979).
In this situation, Gates' appeal is frivolous. As indicated previously, the brief of
Gates makes no attempt to marshal any of the evidence against him, which includes his
own contradictory testimony, the documentation which speaks for itself, as well as the
findings of the Labor Commissioner. Further, his legal analysis regarding the citation of
two criminal cases is void of any benefit to this Court. His failure to properly cite to
either the record or case law is inappropriate. Additionally, his failure to indicate where
any issues had been preserved before the administrative agency is inappropriate. Also,
his conduct is misstating the Commission's findings as to the relationship between Kelly
Gates, Jr. and Kelly Gates, Sr. in forming an automobile partnership is improper.
The above mentioned conduct is sanctionable in and of itself. However, Gates has
gone further than simply submitting a baseless brief. He has referenced admittedly
"doctored" evidence and makes argument that is not based in fact or law.
At hearing, Gates' responses to Interrogatories, Request for Production of
Documents and Things was admitted into evidence. (Rl at 173-210). The answers and
corresponding documents were signed under oath by Kelly Gates, Sr. (Rl at 186-7). The
bank documentation in the form of "loan advances" attached to the Request for
Production of Documents appearing at page 196-7 of the record were admittedly
"doctored" according to the testimony of Kelly Gates, Jr. (R3 at 175).
That "doctored" evidence came in the form of discovery responses from Kelly
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Gates, Sr. It was his witness, Kelly Gates, Jr. who indicated those documents were
"doctored". Yet, instead of correcting the "doctored" documents which were received
into evidence, Gates, Sr. instead relies on the bank records throughout the course of his
brief:
Q.

Okay. Wasn't Mr. Rasmussen paid for work on your son's home in
Diamond Valley on checks drawn on the account of Kelly Gates
Enterprises?

A.

Yes. And so was Mr. Anderson.

Q.

So they weren't paid by your son, they were paid by your company?

A.

Mr. Anderson would come in at least every other day and want to get paid,
and my son, I called him up one day and he explained that he took a draw
every two weeks, he couldn't pay him except every two weeks, so we
would write - he'd say dad, would you write him a check, I'll reimburse
you, which we did and which I was reimbursed by the bank and that's the
way it was submitted. (Emphasis in original) (See brief of Gates at page
24-5).

In his brief, Gates continues to rely on the testimony referring to bank records:
Q.

But he didn't pay the helpers, you paid the helpers?

A.

They weren't working for him, they were working for my son.

Q.

I see. And they were paid by you?

A.

My son would ask me to pay them and he'd make the draw and reimburse
me. (Emphasis in original)

Q.

(By Mr. Wright): Now, you also indicated that (Anderson) wanted to be
paid more often than every two weeks or whenever the draws were
available at the bank; is that right?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

And some of the documents you looked at indicated he was paid sometimes
28

every other day; is that right?
A.

One time he was paid the next day. . .

Q.

Okay. And so when that happened, did Mr. Kelly Gates, Jr. have the
money to pay those requests on a daily basis like that?

A.

No. He did not. In fact, he told Mr. Anderson that it would be paid by a
draw and it would be two to three weeks on a draw.

(See brief of Gates at page 25).
Not only did Gates, Sr. rely on the falsified bank documents, but so did Kelly
Gates, Jr. in his testimony. That is again identified in Gates' brief:
Q.

Did you have funds of your own to cover his requests between draws?

A.

No. No.

Q.

Okay. So what happened then?

A.

Dad would pay Mike, and then when I could turn in a draw every week or
every two weeks, I'd reimburse dad. (Emphasis in original)

(See brief of Gates at page 26).
Gates, Sr. relies on testimony and documentation regarding the draws to such an
extent that he emphasizes the testimony in his brief by underlining the references. One
would hope that Gates and his attorney would take remedial steps to correct the
"doctored" documents. However, they do the opposite and refer to the "doctored" draws
to support the claim made in this appeal. That is inappropriate conduct and should not be
condoned by this Court.
In addition to the above mentioned improprieties, Gates makes legal argument
which has no merit. Gates raises, as his first issue, whether he "was substantially
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prejudiced by the Labor Commissioner who did not participate in the hearing, did not
hear the testimony, observe the witnesses and with only a cold transcript before him,
reversed the Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law and Order the Administrative
Judge who heard the case, observed the witnesses, and reviewed the evidence? (See brief
of Gates at 1). The law on this point is relatively clear.
The Utah Labor Code specifically allows the Commission to reverse the findings
of the Administrative Law Judge. In relevant part, UTAH CODE ANN. §34A-l-303(4)(a)
provides, "on appeal, the Commissioner or the Appeals Board may:
(i) affirm the decision of an Administrative Law Judge;
(ii) modify the decision of an Administrative Law Judge;
(iii) return the case to an Administrative Law Judge for further action as directed;
or
(iv) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decisions of an Administrative Law
Judge." (Emphasis added)
Obviously, the legislature has granted to the Labor Commissioner and the Appeals
Board the authority to reverse the findings of the ALJ. Further, Utah case law supports
the conclusion that the final arbiter of the findings of fact in a case before the Labor
Commission is the Labor Commission, not the ALJ.

In United States Steel v. Industrial Comm 'n 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 1980), the
Supreme Court dealt with facts very similar to those addressed here. There, after an
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evidentiary hearing on an injured workers claim for workers compensation benefits, the
ALJ determined the injured worker lacked credibility, found no work accident to have
occurred, and denied compensation. The injured worker sought review by the Industrial
Commission. Based on the same record which was in front of the ALJ, the Commission
found that the injured worker had indeed been involved in an accident at work.
U.S. Steel appealed and argued that it was improper for the Labor Commission to
substitute its findings for those of the ALJ, particularly when the ALJ had based his
findings on the credibility of a witness. The Supreme Court rejected U.S. Steel's
argument summarily:
Our statutes do not mandate or indicate that the Commission is bound by
the findings of the Administrative Law Judge when the evidence is
conflicting. On the contrary, Section 35-1-82.54 provides that when a case
is referred to the full Commission, it shall review the entire record, and may
make its own findings of fact and enter its award thereon. In doing so it
may, in its discretion, take further evidence. Though this Court cannot
overturn the findings of fact made by the Commission if there is substantial
evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for such findings, there is nothing in
our statutes which limits the power of the Commission itself in reviewing
and adopting or reversing the findings of its Administrative Law Judge. . .
(citations omitted).
Utah Appellate Courts have always held that an ALJ's findings are not binding in
later proceedings before an administrative agency. See, Giles v. Industrial Comm 'n 967
P.2d 743, 745 (Utah 1984); USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm % 781 P.2d 883, 886 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989); Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Chase v. Industrial Comm 'n 872 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Commercial
Carriers v. Industrial Comm 'n, 888 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
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On this issue, Utah law is consistent with the majority rule in other states. As
noted by Professor Larson in Larson's Workers Compensation Law §80.12(b), p. 15-565:
It also follows logically that the rule of conclusiveness of administrative
findings of fact should apply to the final action of the Director or full
Board, rather than the decision of the referee. . . . The fact that the
Commission took no new evidence is immaterial. Moreover, in states
adhering to the orthodox rule, no exception is made even when the issue is
credibility of a witness, and when only the referee and not the Commission
had the benefit of first hand observation of the witness.
Utah Law is clear that the Commission has the authority to supplant the ALJ's
findings of fact with it's own based upon the same evidence presented to the ALJ.
Indeed, that is the rule from the majority of jurisdictions.
The above referenced argument was set forth in Anderson's Motion for Summary
Disposition before this Court. Obviously, Gates must be aware that his argument the
Commission cannot supplant the findings of the ALJ is without merit. In fact Gates for
the first time "acknowledges that the Commissioner had the authority and the power to
reverse the findings of the Administrative Law Judge, but due process demands there be a
legally justifiable basis for such reversal." (See brief of Gates at page 9).
Nevertheless, Gates goes on to make the exact same argument that he made in
front of the administrative agency, that the two criminal cases to which he cites are
relevant to an administrative proceeding. (R2 at 427-47). In fact, the argument that he
made in front of the Appeals Board is parroted back in his brief almost verbatim. That is
not appropriate. There is no merit to the legal argument set forth in Gates' brief and it
should be summarily dismissed and attorney fees and costs should be awarded.
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CONCLUSION

The brief of Gates fails, in almost every respect, to comply with Rule 24 and
should not be considered by this Court. The evidence in this case, when marshaled, is
clear and supports the findings of the Labor Commissioner in all respects. Finally, the
appeal brought by Gates is not brought or asserted in good faith, is frivolous in all aspects
and, as such, an award of attorney fees and costs should enter.
DATED this £j ^

day of May, 2002.

:>n J.J. (Pii
(Prkbxey--^^,.
Aaron
Attorney fdrPeti'tioner/Appellant
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Mr. J. MacArthur Wright
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Mr. Alan Hennebold
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Addendum A

(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall
D n t a m under appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the
)urt or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed,
ccept where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names
all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate
ige which appears immediately inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the
Idendum, with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged
id with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other
Lthorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief
tere they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate
urt.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including
r each issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting

thonty; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved
the trial court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not
eserved m the trial court.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and
galations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal
of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim
th the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the
ovision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
ovision shall be set forth m an addendum to the brief under
ragraph (11) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate
Lefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and
5 disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts
Levant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All
atements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall
supported by citations to the record in accordance with
-agraph (e) of this rule.
'8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
agraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments
ually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere
)etition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and
isons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented,
luding the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
ts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding
t first marshall all record evidence that supports the challenged
ding.
10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as
t of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably
ck. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall
tain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy
Date
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any constitutional provision, statute rule, or regulation
>ntral importance cited in the brief but not reproduced
itim m the brief;
in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court
)peals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central
tance to the appeal but not available to the court as part
regularly published reporter service; and
those parts of the record on appeal that are of central
tance to the determination of the appeal, such as the
enged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law,
"andum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision,
le contract or document subject to construction.
Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall
)rm to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except
the appellee need not include:
a statement of the issues or of the case unless the
Llee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or
i an addendum, except to provide material not included in the
idum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum
le appellant.
> Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief m reply to the
Z of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed,
appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the
Llant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply
fs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
apposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform
le requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of
rule. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of
appellate court.
) References m briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected
leir briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum
trences to parties by such designations as "appellant" and
Bllee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in
Lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names
arties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the
red person," "the taxpayer," etc.
) References m briefs to the record. References shall be
to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to
11 (b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or
aedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11 (f)
1 (g). References to pages of published depositions or
scripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover
of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right
er and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within
deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber,
rences to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If
rence is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in
roversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record
hich the evidence was identified, offered, and received or
cted.
) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court,
cipal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs
1 not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the
e of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
a m i n g statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the
rd as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases
lving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth

(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal
filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be
emed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26,
less the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders,
e brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length.
e brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the
sues and arguments involved m the cross-appeal as well as the
swer to the brief of the appellant and shall not exceed 50
ges in length. The appellant shall then file a brief which
ntains an answer to the original issues raised by the
pellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response
the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief. The
oellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 pages m length. The
oellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not to
reed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the
Dellant's answers to the original issues raised by the
Dellee/cross-appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by
LS rule are exclusive of table of contents, table of
:horities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission
the court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good
ise shown.
(h) Briefs m cases involving multiple appellants or appellees.
cases involving more than one appellant or appellee, including
ses consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of
.her may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee
/ adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties
/ similarly join m reply briefs.
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and
jnificant authorities come to the attention of a party after
it party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but
ore decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the
)ellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An
ginal letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme
rt. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the
irt of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page
the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations
tain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within
ays of filing and shall be similarly limited.
j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must
concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with
per headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be
regarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court,
the court may assess attorney fees against the offending
yer.
k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy
er stock and shall comply with Rule 27.
EQ 8. Checklist for Briefs - Rules 24, 26, and 27.
fective upon April 1, 2002.
eadlines for Filing
Appellant: 40 days from notice by clerk.
Appellee: 30 days from appellant's brief.
Reply: 30 days from appellee's brief.
:oof of Service
nat-o
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In criminal appeals arising from a felony charge, upon the Attorney
ral.
In criminal appeals arising from a misdemeanor charge, upon the
ecuting attorney.
In appeals from the juvenile court, upon the Attorney General. See
ion 78-3a-909.
Original signature required on proof of service,
mber of Copies
Supreme Court: Ten copies - one with original signature.
Court of Appeals: Eight copies - one with original signature.
Two copies served on counsel for each party separately represented,
ngth
Appellant and Appellee: 50 pages, excluding addendum.
Reply: 25 pages, excluding addendum.
Petition for Rehearing: 15 pages, excluding addendum,
ze and Binding
Size: 81/2" x 11".
Binding: Compact or Velio binding required; coiled plastic or
al binding not acceptable.
inting Requirements
Margins at least one inch on top, bottom and sides of each page.
Proportionally spaced typeface must be 13-pomt or larger for both
and footnotes. A monospaced typeface may not contain more than ten
meters per inch for both text and footnotes.
Print on both sides of the page.
Double spaced; 11/2 line spacing is not acceptable.
/er Requirements
Heavy weight paper.
Color:
reliant or Petitioner
. . .
)ellee or Respondent . . . .
>iy
cus, Intervener, Guardian .
ltion for Rehearing . . . .
>ponse to Pet'n for Rehearing
ltion for Certiorari
. . .
ef m Opposition to Cert
)ly to Brief m Opposition .

Blue
Red
Gray
Green
Tan
White
White
Orange
Yellow

Caption of the Case:
full title of the case as it appeared in the trial court or agency;
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ency (e.g., "plaintiff/defendant");
c. designation of zne parties as they appear in the appellate court
.g., "appellant/appellee").
4. Name of the appellate court ("In the Utah Supreme Court") ("In the
ah Court of Appeals").
5.

Appellate court docket number.

6. Title of the document (e.g., "Brief of the Appellant", "Brief of
e Appellee").
7.

Nature of the proceeding (e.g., "appeal", "petition for review").

3. Name of the trial court or agency and name of the judge (e.g.,
Dpeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Judge Smith").
d.

Name of counsel and the parties they represent:

a.

counsel filing brief on lower right;

}.

opposing counsel on lower left.

Content Requirements - In the Order Stated
List of all parties unless the caption on the cover shows all
ties .
'.

Table of contents with page references.

Table of authorities with page references: (a) cases listed
>habetically with parallel citations; (b) rules; (c) statutes; (d)
er authorities.
Statement showing jurisdiction of the appellate court.
Statement of the issues. For each issue state the standard of
lew and supporting authority. (Optional with appellee if there is no
agreement with appellant's statement.)
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, and
es set forth verbatim or by citation alone if they are set forth
batim in the addendum.
Statement of the case (Optional with appellee if there is no
agreement with appellant's statement):
nature of the case;
course of proceedings;
disposition at trial court or agency.
Relevant facts with citation to the record.
Summary of the argument.
).

Detail of the argument.

L.

Conclusion containing a statement of the relief sought.

\
Original signature of counsel of record or party appearing without
lsel on one copy of brief; reproduced signature on other copies.
idendum

Attach at end of brief or file separately.
Not counted against tuidl page numoei.
Contents:
Reproduction of opinion, memorandum decision, findings of fact,
lusions of law, orders, or jury instructions;
Reproduction of parts of the record of central importance such as
racts or other documents;
Reproduction of determinative constitutional provisions, statutes,
ules. Supplement to the Brief
By letter to the court. Original and nine copies to Supreme Court.
inal and five copies to Court of Appeals.
File any time prior to decision, even after oral argument.
Citation of supplemental authority with statement of reason. No new
ment.
Reference to page of brief or point in oral argument supplemented.
Response to be filed within seven days.
tion for Enlargement of Time
By stipulation: Rule 26
first extension only;
limit: 30 days;
file prior to expiration of original deadline.
By motion: Rules 22 & 23
File prior to deadline; show original deadline sought to be extended;
Show number and length of previous extensions;
Give date certain on which brief will be filed;
Set forth facts constituting good cause for the request.
nded effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995;
1 1, 1998; November 1, 1999; amended effective April 1, 2002.)

Addendum B

-4b£>-16. Judicial review - Formal
judicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals
3 jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal
judicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from
-mal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for
new
of agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form
juired by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
b^
The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall
r e m all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
3)
The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for
iicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the
in Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that:
a)
all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten,
imarize, or organize the record;
b)
the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
les for the record:
I)
against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten,
m a n z e , or organize the record; or
II)

according to any other provision of law.

4)
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review
been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
a)
the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency
ion is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
b)
the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any
tute;
c)
the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring
olution;
d)

the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;

e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making
:ess, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as
scision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
}) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
.led by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
;ed m light of the whole record before the court;
I)

the agency action is:

_)

an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;

i)

contrary to a rule of the agency;

n)
contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency
ifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate
tir and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
v)

otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Addendum C

torney•s zees.
(a) Damages for delay
or frivolous
appeal.
Except in a first
Deal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that
notion made or appeal taken under these rules is either
L V O I O U S or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may
:lude single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or
asonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may
ier that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's
.orney.
(b) Definitions.
For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous
)eal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good
th argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An
)eal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose
delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
ass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or
n time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal,
ion, brief, or other paper.

c)

Procedures.

1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or
n its own motion. A party may request damages under this rule
y as part of the appellee's motion for summary disposition
er Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a
ty's response to a motion or other paper.
2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court,
court shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or
h an order to show cause why such damages should not be
rded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations
ch form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days
which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause
wn. The order to show cause m a y be part of the notice of oral
ument.
3) If requested b y a party against whom damages m a y be
rded, the court shall grant a hearing.
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Case No. 97694

GEORGE M. ANDERSON,
Petitioner,

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
& ORDER

KELLY GATES SR.
aka KELLE GATES SR. (uninsured)
and the UNINSURED EMPLOYERS
FUND,
Respondents.

HEARING:

July 1,1999 at 3:00 P.M.
Fifth District Court
Courtroom J
220 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770

BEFORE:

Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).

APPEARANCES:

George M. Anderson (Anderson, petitioner or applicant) is
represented by attorney Aaron Prisbrey.
The respondent, Kelly Gates Sr. (Gates Sr. or respondent) is
represented by attorney J. MacArthur Wright.
The Uninsured Employer's Fund is represented by attorney
Sherrie Hayashi.
INTRODUCTION OF CASE

Anderson filed a pro se Application for Hearing with the Labor Commission on
August 27,1997 requesting medical expenses, temporary total and permanent partial
disability compensation and travel expenses. Anderson alleges that he sustained an
industrial accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by Kelly Gates Sr.
on January 17,1996. That Application was assigned case number 97694, a copy was
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sent to the Respondents, an Answer thereto was timely filed and the matter was
ultimately set for this hearing. Attorney Prisbrey entered the case on behalf of the
petitioner on March 24,1998.
Seven exhibits were admitted without objection, four by the petitioner and three
by the respondents. Petitioner invoked the exclusionary rule and accordingly the
witnesses were sworn, instructed, and all that were not parties left the room. After
having taken that step, the petitioner then called respondent Kelly Gates Sr. as his first
witness and examined him extensively for over two hours. Petitioner called as his
second witness Seymour Hoskins, and at last petitioner presented his own testimony.
It should be noted that there are two Kelly Gates, father (who is the respondent)
and his son, hereinafter respectively referred to as Gates Sr. and Gates II.
The respondents presented the testimony of Gates Sr. and Gates II.
The issue for resolution is whether Gates was an employer and Anderson an
employee within the purview of the Workers Compensation Act, or whether the work
Anderson was doing was exempted from the Workers Compensation Act pursuant to
U.C.A. 34A-2-103 (6)(b) exempting those constructing their own home.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The occurrence of Anderson's injury on January 17,1996, the ensuing treatment,
time off work and impairment are not contested. It is stipulated that he was working 26
hours per week at $12 per hour, was married and had one child.
Although Hoskins was listed as the contractor and did put in the footings for the
house, he denied that he was the general contractor and no party has joined him in this
action. Hoskins testified that he knew Gates II was building the house and that Gates
Sr. was just helping his son.
As he had been for approximately 6 weeks on January 17,1996 Anderson was
involved in framing a personal residence for Gates II. When Anderson was breaking a
metal band around some lumber, the band struck and lacerated his left wrist.
Anderson was off work from the date of injury to June 1, I996 when he was released to
full duty.
Gates Sr's livelihood was in automobile dealerships from which he is now semiretired, i.e., he still has an interest in a St. George dealership. Gates Sr. had hired a
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contractor to build an apartment house for him previously in 1985. He also has some
storage units, two of which he was remodeling into office space with Anderson and
other assistants. At Anderson's request, Anderson was paid cash for his work on the
conversion. Anderson also did some work for Gates Sr. at a personal cabin in Kolob
canyon. Anderson made the same request for payment in cash for the work on the
cabin. The storage-unit-to-office conversion was going on at the same time as the
construction of Gates ll's home, where the alleged industrial accident occurred. Gates
Sr. had built his own home previously and the same plans were used in the
construction of this home for Gates II.
Gates Sr. gave Gates II the lot where the accident occurred on the condition
that he would live on it for at least 5 years. Gates Sr. advised his son to build his own
home because of the savings that Gates II could make. On August 17,1995, Gates II
and his wife took out a construction loan in their sole names to build the house. Gates
II was 21 years old at the time and intended for this house to be his family's own home.
Gates II hired Anderson to work for him at $12 per hour. Anderson came to work when
he wanted.
At the time the home was being constructed, Gates II was working full time but
varying shifts at Smith's. During the same period, he was also working approximately
30 hours flex time at a car lot as a commission salesman. Both jobs were
approximately 10 to 12 minutes from the home site.
Petitioner Anderson was newly married and his wife was pregnant at the time
Anderson was working on Gates ll's home. Anderson often asked Gates II for payment
after having worked just a day or two but Gates II could only submit reimbursement
requests from the construction loan at two week intervals. Since Gates II could not
personally advance the requested amounts to Anderson [it does seem unlikely that at
21 years old and married, he was working two jobs for any reason other than economic
necessity], and he wanted to keep Anderson on the job, he asked his father to make
the interim payments Anderson requested. Gates Sr. made those payments from his
business checking account, Gates Enterprises. When Gates II would submit his
reimbursement request to the bank and that was received, he would pay his father
back. Gates Sr. did not receive any consideration for the sums advanced, doing so
only at his son's request to help him out.
With his son working long hours on two jobs, semi-retired Gates Sr. would also
help his son by going to the home to monitor Anderson and other workmen's hours, run
errands for materials, and help as requested by Anderson. Gates Sr. also advanced at
his son's request, payments to other individuals working on the house, who had the
same frequent need for money as did Anderson. Gates Sr. was always reimbursed for
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the exact amounts that he advanced on his son's behalf.
After Anderson was injured, and since he had no personal health insurance, he
went to Gates II and asked for some help so he could get the medical attention that he
needed. In anticipation that Anderson would soon return and be able to work off any
advance, Gates II recalls that he loaned Anderson $2,500; $1,000 by his personal
check dated January 31,1996, another $1,000.00 check and $500.00 in cash. Gates II
thinks he got some of the money from the bank under a construction loan advance,
while Gates Sr. thinks he advanced $1,000.00 of that for his son.
Anderson attempts to interject the tests to determine whether a person is an
independent contractor or an employee in ascertaining whether this is a covered
accident. That is not an appropriate test when the question is whether the exemption
for a personal residence applies. In this case, Gates Sr. was just the interim financing
until his son was able to get draws from the bank and then Gates Sr. was promptly
reimbursed. There has been no showing that this residence was intended for anything
other than Gates ll's personal residence. Gates Sr. did not own the lot, he was not
building this home, he did not take out the loan for the financing on it, and he received
nothing but a return of the amounts he advanced on his son's behalf. In the financial
respect as well as in having the time flexibility in his semi-retired situation to go to the
home site and keep track of the hours worked by various individuals, Gates Sr. was a
simply a father helping his son, or at worst, a beneficent agent for his son.
There is a question of credibility in this case, that is raised by the vastly different
representations between Anderson's testimony and all of the other witnesses.
However, where petitioner so ordered the testimony of Gates Sr. before his own, the
opportunity for adaptive testimony was in Anderson's hands and he fully utilized it. His
testimony is starkly contrary in nearly every respect with all of the other witnesses,
Gates Sr., Gates II (who had been excluded under the petitioner's invocation of the
exclusionary rule), and his own witness, Seymour Hoskins. Having had an opportunity
to observe the testimony, candor and demeanor of the witnesses over the course of this
five-hour hearing, and considering the powerful economic incentive to Anderson in
gaining $4200+ in temporary total disability compensation and $6,800+ in permanent
partial disability compensation as well as avoiding the substantial medical expenses
incurred, the ALJ finds that Anderson lacks credibility.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Although no claim was brought against him, a preponderance of the evidence
establishes that Kelly Gates II was engaged in the construction of his personal
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residence and was therefore not an employer pursuant to U.C.A. 34A-2-103 (6) (b).
Petitioner George Anderson has failed to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that Kelly Gates Sr. was his employer on January 17,1996 while Anderson was
working on Gates ll's home, therefore all of the petitioners claims against Kelly Gates
Sr. and the Uninsured Employers Fund should be dismissed with prejudice.

ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that all of the petitioner George M. Anderson's
claims under the Application for Hearing filed August 27,1997 against Kelly Gates Sr.
(aka Kelle Gates Sr.) are hereby denied and dismissed with prejudice.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the
Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set
forth the specific basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30
days from the date this decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their
Responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion for
Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission
conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for
Review or its Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the
Appeals Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.

DATED THIS 19th day of January, 2001

Donald L. George
Administrative Law Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
& Order in the matter of George M. Anderson was mailed, first class, postage prepaid
this 19th day of January, 2001, to the following:
GEORGE M. ANDERSON
195 W MAIN STREET
ROCKVILLE, UTAH 84763
KELLE GATES
2306 VINEYARD DRIVE
SANTA CLARA, UTAH 84765
AARON PRISBREY, ATTY
ST GEORGE, UTAH 84770
SHERRIE HAYASHI, ATTY
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
160 E 300 S, 3rd FLOOR
P O BOX 146612
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6612
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UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
160 E 300 S, 3rd FLOOR
P O BOX 146612
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6612
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
GEORGE M. ANDERSON,
Applicant,
v.

-

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

-

ORDER OF REMIND

-

Case No. 97-0694

KELLY GATES, SR. and
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND,
Defendants.

George M Anderson asks the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law
Judge's denial of Mr Anderson's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the
Act", Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann )
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin Code R602-2-1 M

BACKGROUND
On January 17, 1996, Mr Anderson was working as a carpenter, framing a residence to be
occupied by Kelly Gates Jr ("Junior' hereafter) As Anderson cut a metal band holding a stack of
lumber, the metal band snapped and cut his wrist Surgery was required to repair the injury
Anderson was unable to work for a period of time after the accident, he may also have suffered some
permanent impairment
Anderson contends he was employed by Junior's father. Kelly Gates Sr (* Senior" hereafter)
at the time of his accident and that Senior is liable for his workers' compensation benefits In
response, Senior argues that Anderson was employed by Junior at the time of his accident Senior
further argues that, because Anderson was employed by Junior in the construction of Junior's own
residence, Anderson is excluded from co\ erage under the workers' compensation system by §34A-2103(6)(b)oftheAct
ISSUE PRESENTED
Who was Mr Anderson's employer at the time of his work-related accident on January 17
19969
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FINDINGS OF FACT
After careful review of the testimony and other evidence presenled in this matter, the
Commission sets aside the ALJ's findings of fact and substitutes the following findings.
It is undisputed that Anderson's injuries resulted from a work-related accident on January
17, 1996. It is also undisputed that Anderson was an employee, rather than an independent
contractor, at the time of the accident. To determine whether Anderson was employed by Junior or
Senior, it is necessary to re\iew the circumstances and context of Anderson's work and his
relationships with Senior and Junior.
Senior is a businessman in the St. George area. In the past, he owned and operated an auto
dealership in St. George, by the time of the hearing in this matter, he had formed another automobile
business, this time with Junior, his son. Under the business name of "Kelly Gates Enterprises,"
Senior owns rental units, condominiums, and town homes. He was also a principal in the
development of a residential subdivision known as Diamond Ranches, located about 15 miles from
St. George. Senior gave Junior a residential building lot in the Diamond Ranch subdivision. It was
at this lot, in the course of the construction of Junior's residence, that Anderson was injured.
At the time of Anderson's accident, Junior was 22 years old. He had little or no experience
with building or construction. He was employed on a full-time basis as an assistant manager at a
grocery store and also worked 30 hours a week as a salesman at a local car dealership, both in St.
George.
In November, 1995, Senior hired Anderson to work on a cabin Senior was building for his
personal use in the Kolob Canyon area north of St. George. Shortly thereafter, Senior also hired
Anderson and several other workers to remodel two storage units located in St. George into business
offices. At the same time as the storage units were being remodeled, Anderson and the other
workers began construction of Junior's residence in Diamond Ranch, where Anderson suffered his
injury on January 17, 1996.
The parties do not substantially dispute the foregoing facts. However, the parties tell very
different versions of the remaining facts. Before the Commission sets out its findings on these
disputed issues, some general comments are in order regarding the relative credibility of the parties.
The ALJ discounted Anderson's testimony, in part, because of his economic
obtaining workers' compensation benefits. But Senior, who has no workers'
insurance, has an equivalent economic interest in avoiding payment of such benefits.
economic interest does not provide a means of judging the relative credibility of
Senior.

self-interest in
compensation
Consequently,
Anderson and
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The ALJ also discounted Anderson's testimony on the grounds it was contradicted by the
testimony of all other witnesses. However, after careful review of Anderson's testimony, the
Commission finds such testimony to be responsive, simple and straight-forward. Furthermore.
Anderson's testimony does not conflict with the testimony of Mr. Hoskins, the only disinterested
individual to testify in this matter.
The Commission has also carefully reviewed the testimony of Senior and Junior and finds
it to be equivocal and inconsistent. Furthermore, Senior and Junior admit to conduct that
undermines their general credibility. For example. Senior asked Mr. Hoskins. a construction
contractor, to turn in Anderson's injury as a claim against Hoskins' workers' compensation insurance
policy. Such a claim would have been fraudulent. To his credit, Mr. Hoskins refused Senior's
request. As another example, even in the project to remodel storage units, where Senior admits to
being Anderson's employer, Senior failed to comply with state and federal laws requiring
withholding of income tax, payment of FICA tax, unemployment insurance contributions, and
obtaining workers' compensation coverage. Finally, Junior admits that he submitted false
information to his construction lender in order to obtain funds to pay Anderson's medical expenses.
The foregoing conduct diminishes the persuasive force of Senior and Junior's testimony.
Returning to the facts of this case, Anderson contends he was hired by Senior to work on
remodeling the storage units in St. George and that the employment relationship continued on to
include work done at Junior's residential building site. According to Anderson, all his significant
dealings were with Senior. He did not see Junior at the building site until the project was well
underway. In response, Junior claims to have personally hired Anderson before the residential
project and to have negotiated the wage to be paid Anderson. However, Junior was unable to
accurately state Anderson's wage rate. In contrast, Senior was fully aware of Anderson's wage rate.
Furthermore, nearly all the crew that Senior employed to remodel his storage units also worked on
Junior's residential project. This supports Anderson's testimony that Senior directed his employees,
Anderson included, to work on Junior's residence.
As is customary in construction projects, Anderson provided his own hand tools such as a
hammer and saw for both the remodel project and the residence project. However. Senior provided
larger equipment such as an air compressor and air-driven nail guns. Junior provided no equipment
or tools.
There is no question that every payment of wages to Anderson was actually made by Senior
from his ''Kelly Gates Enterprises'' checking account. At first, Senior testified that his payments to
Anderson were solely an accommodation to Anderson's frequent need for cash and that such
payments did not include any payments for Anderson's work on Senior's remodeling project.
However, when confronted by financial records to the contrary, Senior conceded that his payments
to Anderson represented co-mingled wages for work on the remodeling project and the residential
project. Junior never paid any wages directly to Anderson, although he did make payments to
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Senior. It is clear that Anderson always looked directly to Senior, not Junior, for payment of wages.
Senior was at the work site on a daily basis. Junior was rarely present. Because Anderson
was an experienced carpenter, he did not require much direction in the actual performance of his
work. However, Senior felt free to exercise control over Anderson. For example. Senior testified
he ordered Anderson off the job because Anderson was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Later in his testimony. Senior attempts to downplay his control by stating that he merely "suggested"
that Anderson not work. But the Commission concludes that Senior's initial testimony is the most
accurate statement of Senior's own perception of his authority over Anderson at the work site. The
Commission also notes that Senior told the workers when to show up for work. Anderson would
clear his absences from work with Senior.
After his accident, when it became clear that Anderson required medical care, Anderson
sought payment from Senior. Senior told Anderson he didn't have any money and directed Anderson
to make his request to Junior. Then, despite Senior's previous statement that he didn't ha\e any
money. Senior transferred $1,000 to Junior, who deposited the funds in his own account for use in
paying some of Anderson's medical expenses. It appears to the Commission that the foregoing
transfer of funds from Senior to Junior was intended to create some evidence that Junior was
Anderson's employer.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
The sole issue before the Commission is whether Anderson was employed by Senior or by
Junior. Section 34A-2-104 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act defines an employee as:
each person in the service of any employer . .. who employs one or more workers or
operatives regularly in the same business, or in or about the same establishment,
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, ... but not including
any person whose employment is casual and not in the usual course of trade,
business, or occupation of the employee's employer.
It is well established that when an employer has retained the right to control the work of a
workers' compensation claimant, the claimant is the employer's employee for workers'
compensation purposes. Bennett v. Industrial Commission. 726 P.2d 427, 429-30 (Utah 1986).
Among the factors commonly used to determine whether an employer has retained the right of
control are: 1) the right to direct the performance of the work; 2) the right to hire and fire; 3)
responsibility for payment of wages; and 4) providing necessary equipment. But these factors are
not inclusive and no one factor is completely controlling. Johnson Brothers Construction v. Labor
Commission, 967 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah App. 1998). Ultimately, it is the right to control that is
determinative. Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisbv, 678 P.2d 305, 309 (Utah 1984).
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In applying the foregoing standards to the facts of this case, the Commission notes that
Anderson was an experienced framer who required little actual direction. However, such direction
as was required came from Senior, not Junior. Senior hired Anderson and directed whether he would
work on the storage unit project or the residential construction project. Senior paid Anderson.
Senior provided such equipment as was necessary to perform the work. In contrast to the pen asive
control that Senior exercised, Junior exercised little or no control.
In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that Anderson was employed b> Senior
at the time of his work-related accident and injury. As Anderson's employer, Senior is liable for
workers' compensation benefits due Anderson on account of his injury. The Commission therefore
remands this matter to the ALJ to determine the amount of such benefits and for such other action
necessary to conclude this matter. In light of the length of time that elapsed between the original
hearing in this matter and the issuance of the ALJ's prior decision, the ALJ is instructed to gi\ e high
priority to the final resolution of this matter.
ORDER
The Commission remands this matter to the ALJ for further proceedings and order consistent
with this decision. It is so ordered.
Dated this ffi day of June, 2001.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion For Review/Order of Remand
in the matter of George M. Anderson. Case No. 97-0694, was mailed first class postage prepaid this
^ ^ d a y of June, 200 L to the following:
GEORGE M. ANDERSON
195 W MAIN STREET
ROCKVILLE UT 84763
KELLY GATES SR.
2306 VINEYARD DR
SANTA CLARA UT 84765
AARON PRISBREY, ATTORNEY
1071 EAST 100 SOUTH BLDG D #3-S
ST GEORGE UT 84770
SHERRIE HAYASHI, ATTORNEY
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
P O BOX 146600
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
J MACARTHUR WRIGHT, ATTORNEY
GALLIAN WESTFALL WILCOX & WRIGHT
59 SOUTH 100 EAST
ST GEORGE UT 84770
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Support Specialist
Utah Labor Commission
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Case No. 97694
GEORGE M ANDERSON,

Petitioner,
ORDER ON REMAND
KELLY GATES SR. aka KELLE
GATES SR. (uninsured) and the
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND,
Respondents.

BEFORE:

Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).

APPEARANCES:

George M. Anderson (Anderson, petitioner or applicant) is
represented by attorney Aaron Prisbrey.
The respondent, Kelly Gates Sr. (Gates Sr. or respondent) is
represented by attorney J. MacArthur Wright.
The Uninsured Employers Fund is represented by attorney Sherrie
Hayashi.

In accordance with the 6/28/2001 Order Granting Motion for Review which made new
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Petitioner's 7/02/01 letter summary of
uncontested evidence (no party having taken issue within 20 days thereafter), the ALJ
hereby issues the following:

ORDER ON REMAND
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that uninsured employer Kelly Gates, Sr. shall pay
Petitioner George M. Anderson temporary total disability compensation at the weekly
rate of $218.10 for the period from January 17, 1996 through June 1, 1996, a period of
19.28 weeks for a total of $4,206.28, plus interest at 8 percent per annum from the date
when each payment would have otherwise been due and payable but less the
attorney's fee hereinafter awarded.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that uninsured employer Kelly Gates, Sr. shall pay
Petitioner George M. Anderson permanent partial disability compensation at the weekly
rate of $218.10 for 31.2 weeks for a 10 percent whole person impairment of his left
upper extremity for a total of $6,804.72, plus interest at 8 percent annum from June 1,
1996 but less the attorney's fee hereinafter awarded.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that uninsured employer Kelly Gates, Sr. shall deduct
attorney's fees from the foregoing temporary total and permanent partial disability
awards and interest according to the Labor Commission sliding scale and remit those
fees directly to Petitioner's attorney, Aaron Prisbrey, at his offices.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that uninsured employer Kelly Gates, Sr. shall pay all
reasonably related and necessary medical expenses incurred as a result of the
industrial accident of January 17, 1996 specifically including but not limited to bills from
Dixie Regional Medical Center, Dr. Lawrence Chase and Dr. R. Mark Albright. The
covered medical expenses are to be paid pursuant to the Relative Value Schedule of
the Labor Commission, plus interest at 8 percent per annum from the date the services
were rendered. To avoid the possibility of future litigation and personal liability, Mr.
Anderson is urged to submit any proposed treatment plan(s) to uninsured employer
Kelly Gates, Sr., for preauthorization.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund has no liability in this
matter as there is no proof that uninsured employer Kelly Gates, Sr. is insolvent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the
specific basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from
the date this decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the
Motion for Review within 20 days of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review
or its Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals
Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.
DATED THIS JlJ^fray

of July, 2001
SION

Donald L. George
Administrative Law Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the J^O^
day of July, 2001, I mailed a copy of the
foregoing Order on Remand, in the matter of George M. Anderson, postage prepaid to
the following:
GEORGE M ANDERSON 195 W MAIN ST ROCKVILLE UT 84763
KELLE GATES 2306 VINEYARD DR SANTA CLARA UT 84765
AARON PRISBREY ATTY 135 N 900 E STE 4 ST GEORGE UT 84770
SHERRIE HAYASHI ATTY UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND 160 E 3RD FL PO BOX
146612 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6612 (Interoffice Mail)
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

Lola Chacon, Support Specialist III
Adjudication Division
(801)530-6079 or 1-800-530-5090

Addendum G

APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
GEORGE M. ANDERSON,
Applicant,

ICO
—

*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

Case No. 97-0694

KELLY GATES, SR. and
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND,
Defendants.

Kelly Gates, Sr. asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review the Labor
Commission's Order dated June 28, 2001, and the Administrative Law Judge's Order of July 30,
2001, awarding benefits to George Anderson under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act";
Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.).
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Anderson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits against Mr. Gates for injuries
sustained in an accident on January 17,1996. In defense against the claim, Mr. Gates alleged he was
not Mr. Anderson's employer at the time of the accident. The ALJ initially accepted Mr. Gates'
argument and denied Mr. Anderson's claim. Mr. Anderson then sought agency review of the ALJ's
decision. Because neither Mr. Anderson nor Mr. Gates opted to present the motion for review to the
Appeals Board, the motion for review was considered by Utah Labor Commissioner.
On June 28, 2001, the Labor Commissioner set aside the ALJ's findings of fact, substituted
his own findings, and concluded that Mr. Gates was Mr. Anderson's employer at the time of the
accident. The Commissioner remanded Mr. Anderson's claim to the ALJ to determine the amount
of benefits due Mr. Anderson. Pursuant to the Commissioner's instruction, the ALJ issued a
decision on July 30,2001, which merely fixed the amount of medical and disability benefits payable
on Mr. Anderson's claim. Mr. Gates has now requested Appeals Board review of both the
Commissioner's decision of June 28, 2001, and the ALJ's decision of July 30, 2001.
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ISSUE PRESENTED
Mr. Gates asks the Appeals Board to set aside the Commissioner's decision in this matter and
reinstate the ALJ's first decision, thereby denying Mr. Anderson's claim and releasing Mr. Gates
from liability for that claim.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
In essence, Mr. Gates asks the Appeals Board to reverse the decision of the Commissioner
in this matter and reinstate an earlier decision of the AL J. However, Mr. Gates has not identified any
statutory authority for the Appeals Board to review decisions of the Commissioner. To the contrary,
§34A-l-303(2)(b) of the Labor Commission Act provides as follows:
Unless a parkin interest to the appeal requests in accordance with Subsection (3) that
the appeal be heard by the Appeals Board, the commissioner shall hear the review in
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. A decision
of the commissioner is a final order of the commission unless set aside by the court
of appeals.
Thus, the only available review of the Commissioner's order is appellate judicial review.
Unless the Commissioner's order is modified by an appellate court of appropriate jurisdiction, the
Commissioner's decision is "the law of the case" and is binding with respect to further proceedings
in this matter.
ORDER
Because the Appeals Board has no authority to review a decision of the Labor Commissioner
and Mr. Gates has raised no other objections to the ALJ's order on remand, the Appeals Board
affirms the decision of the ALJ dated July 30, 2001, and denies Mr. Gates' motion for review. It is
so ordered.
Dated this p

day of November, 2001.

Patricia S. Drawe

IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
GEORGE M. ANDERSON
PAGE 3
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the
court within 30 days of the date of this order.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of
George M. Anderson, Case No. 97-0694, was mailed first class postage prepaid this J ^ j l a y of
November, 2001, to the following:
GEORGE M. ANDERSON
195 W MAIN STREET
ROCKVILLE UT 84763
KELLY GATES SR.
2306 VINEYARD DR
SANTA CLARA UT 84765
AARON PRISBREY, ATTORNEY
1071 EAST 100 SOUTH BLDG D #3-S
ST GEORGE UT 84770
SHERRIE HAYASHI, ATTORNEY
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
P O BOX 146600
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
J MACARTHUR WRIGHT, ATTORNEY
GALLIAN WESTFALL WILCOX & WRIGHT
59 SOUTH 100 EAST
ST GEORGE UT 84770
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Sara Jenscwf
Support^Specialist
Utah Labor Commission
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